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Abstract
Background: Recent developments in cosmology radically change the conception of the universe
as well as the very notions of "probable" and "possible". The model of eternal inflation implies that
all macroscopic histories permitted by laws of physics are repeated an infinite number of times in
the infinite multiverse. In contrast to the traditional cosmological models of a single, finite universe,
this worldview provides for the origin of an infinite number of complex systems by chance, even as
the probability of complexity emerging in any given region of the multiverse is extremely low. This
change in perspective has profound implications for the history of any phenomenon, and life on
earth cannot be an exception.
Hypothesis: Origin of life is a chicken and egg problem: for biological evolution that is governed,
primarily, by natural selection, to take off, efficient systems for replication and translation are
required, but even barebones cores of these systems appear to be products of extensive selection.
The currently favored (partial) solution is an RNA world without proteins in which replication is
catalyzed by ribozymes and which serves as the cradle for the translation system. However, the
RNA world faces its own hard problems as ribozyme-catalyzed RNA replication remains a
hypothesis and the selective pressures behind the origin of translation remain mysterious. Eternal
inflation offers a viable alternative that is untenable in a finite universe, i.e., that a coupled system
of translation and replication emerged by chance, and became the breakthrough stage from which
biological evolution, centered around Darwinian selection, took off. A corollary of this hypothesis
is that an RNA world, as a diverse population of replicating RNA molecules, might have never
existed. In this model, the stage for Darwinian selection is set by anthropic selection of complex
systems that rarely but inevitably emerge by chance in the infinite universe (multiverse).
Conclusion: The plausibility of different models for the origin of life on earth directly depends on
the adopted cosmological scenario. In an infinite universe (multiverse), emergence of highly
complex systems by chance is inevitable. Therefore, under this cosmology, an entity as complex as
a coupled translation-replication system should be considered a viable breakthrough stage for the
onset of biological evolution.
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Evolution of the cosmos: eternal inflation, "many worlds in 
one", and anthropic selection
The "many worlds in one" (hereinafter MWO) model
makes the startling prediction that all macroscopic,
"coarse-grain" histories of events that are not forbidden
by conservation laws of physics have realized (or will real-
ize) somewhere in the infinite universe, and not just once
but an infinite number of times [1,2]. There is, e.g., an
infinite number of (macroscopically) exact copies of the
earth with everything that exists on it, although the prob-
ability that a given observable region of the universe
(hereinafter O-region) carries one of such copies is vanish-
ingly tiny. This picture seems counterintuitive in the
extreme but it is a direct consequence of eternal inflation,
the dominant model of the evolution of the universe in
modern cosmology [3-5].
Inflation is the period of the exponentially fast initial
expansion of a universe [6]. In the most plausible, self-
consistent inflationary models, inflation is eternal, with
an infinite number of island (pocket) universes (hereinaf-
ter, simply, universes) emerging through the decay of
small regions of the primordial "sea" of false (high
energy) vacuum and comprising the infinite multiverse.
To observers within each universe, it appears self-con-
tained and infinite, and containing an infinite number of
O-regions. For such observers (like us), their universe is
expanding from a singularity (Big Bang) which corre-
sponds to the end of inflation in the given part of the mul-
tiverse. Inflation is in excellent agreement with several
crucial results of observational cosmology – above all, the
flatness of space in our O-region, the overall uniformity of
the cosmic microwave background radiation, and its local
non-homogeneities [7]. Furthermore, the "populated
landscape" version of string theory independently yields a
very similar model of the multiverse [8-11]. Thus,
although the model of eternal inflation cannot be consid-
ered proved, this is the strongly preferred current scenario
of the cosmic evolution.
Garriga and Vilenkin showed that, in a finite time, the
content of each O-region can assume only a finite number
of states and, accordingly, any O-region has a finite, even
if unimaginably vast (on the order of 10^10150), number
of unique macroscopic, coarse-grain histories [1]. Effec-
tively, the finiteness of the number of coarse-grain histo-
ries appears to be a straightforward corollary of quantum
uncertainty [2]. The same conclusion is independently
reached through a completely different approach, namely,
the so-called holographic bound on the amount of
entropy that can be contained in any finite region of the
universe [1,11,12]. Combined, eternal inflation, the
finiteness of the number of unique coarse-grain histories,
and the inevitable quantum randomness at the Big Bing
(the beginning of time for each universe) lead to the
straightforward and striking conclusion that each history
permitted by conservation laws of physics is repeated an
infinite number of times in the multiverse and, actually,
in each of the infinite number of infinite (island) uni-
verses [2,11].
The MWO model is tightly linked to the anthropic princi-
ple (anthropic selection), a controversial but increasingly
popular concept among cosmologists. According to the
anthropic principle, the only "reason" our O-region has
its specific parameters is that, otherwise, there would be
no observers to peer into the universe [13-15]. Of course,
it should be emphasized that I only discuss here what is
often called "weak" anthropic principle and is the only
acceptable scientific rendering of this concept. The so-
called "strong" anthropic principle is the teleological
notion that our (human) existence is, in some mysterious
sense, the "goal" of the evolution of the universe; as such,
this idea does not belong in the scientific domain. It
appears that the anthropic principle can be realistically
defined only in the context of a vast (or infinite) multi-
verse [10]. In particular, in the MWO model, anthropic
selection has a straightforward interpretation: the param-
eters of our O-region are selected among the vast number
of parameter sets existing in the multiverse (in an infinite
number of copies each) by virtue of being conducive to
the emergence and sustenance of complex life forms.
Compared to older cosmological concepts that consid-
ered a finite universe, the MWO model changes the very
notions of "possible", "likely", and "random" with respect
to any historical scenario (see Table 1). Simply put, the
probability of the realization of any scenario permitted by
the conservation laws in an infinite universe (and, of
course, in the multiverse) is, exactly, one. Conversely, the
probability that a given scenario is realized in the given O-
region is equal to the frequency of that scenario in the uni-
verse. From a slightly different perspective, the usual
adage about the second law of thermodynamics being
true in the statistical sense takes a literal meaning in an
infinite universe: any violation of this law that is permit-
ted by other conservation laws will happen – and on an
infinite number of occasions. Thus, spontaneous emer-
gence of complex systems that would have to be consid-
ered virtually impossible in a finite universe becomes not
only possible but inevitable under MWO, even though the
prior probabilities of the vast majority of histories to
occur in a given O-region are vanishingly small. This new
power of chance, buttressed by anthropic selection, is
bound to have profound consequences for our under-Biology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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standing of any phenomenon in the universe, and life on
earth cannot be an exception.
The central problem: the emergence of biological 
evolution, the inherent paradoxes of the origin of 
replication and translation systems, and the limitations of 
the RNA world
The origin(s) of replication and translation (hereinafter
OORT) is qualitatively different from other problems in
evolutionary biology and might be viewed as the hardest
problem in all of biology. As soon as sufficiently fast and
accurate genome replication emerges, biological evolution
takes off. I use this general term to include Darwinian nat-
ural selection[16] along with other major evolutionary
mechanisms, such as fixation of neutral mutations that
provide material for subsequent adaptation [17], exapta-
tion of "spandrels" (features that originally emerge as evo-
lutionary by-products but are subsequently utilized for
new functions) [18], and duplication of genome regions
followed by mutational and functional diversification
[19]. All these processes that, together, comprise biologi-
cal evolution become possible and, actually, inevitable
once and only once efficient replication of the genetic
material is established.
The crucial question, then, is how was the minimal com-
plexity attained that is required to achieve the threshold
replication fidelity. In even the simplest modern systems,
such as RNA viruses with the replication fidelity of only
~10-3, replication is catalyzed by a complex protein repli-
case; even disregarding accessory subunits present in most
replicases, the main catalytic subunit is a protein that con-
sists of at least 300 amino acids [20]. The replicase, of
course, is produced by translation of the respective mRNA
which is mediated by a tremendously complex molecular
machinery. Hence the first paradox of OORT: to attain the
minimal complexity required for a biological system to
start on the path of biological evolution, a system of a far
greater complexity, i.e., a highly evolved one, appears to
be required. How such a system could evolve, is a puzzle
that defeats conventional evolutionary thinking.
The commonly considered solution is the RNA world sce-
nario, i.e., the notion that replication evolved before
Table 1: Some central new definitions and reinterpretation of familiar definitions in the MWO model
Term(s) Definition
Inflation Exponential expansion of the multiverse driven by the repulsive gravity of the false (high energy) 
vacuum; inflation is likely to be eternal, i.e., once started, it will never end.
Multiverse (megaverse, master universe) The entire fabric of reality that consists of eternally inflating false vacuum with an infinite number 
of decaying small decaying regions giving rise to universes.
Universe (island universe, pocket 
universe, bubble universe)
Part of the multiverse that expands from a Big Bang event resulting from a decay of a region of 
false vacuum into low energy (true) vacuum. A universe is infinite from the point of view of an 
internal observer but finite to an imaginary external observer.
Observable (O) region A finite region within a universe that can be observed from any given point, i.e., the interior of the 
past light cone of the given point; our O-region contains ~1020 stars.
Big Bang In the traditional 20th century cosmology, expansion of the universe from a singularity; the nature 
of the "bang" has never been elucidated. In the eternal inflation cosmology, Big Bang corresponds 
to the end of inflation in the given region of the multiverse as a result of false vacuum decay and 
the formation of a universe in the form of an expanding bubble of low-energy (true) vacuum.
Macroscopic (coarse-grained) history Any combination of physical events permitted by the laws of physics, characterized to the limit of 
quantum uncertainty and occurring in an O-region within a finite time; it has been shown that the 
number of all possible macroscopic histories is finite, although vast. Hence even within a single 
universe, each history is repeated an infinite number of times.
Probability/chance/randomness Textbooks define probability as the limit to which frequency of a specific outcome tends when 
the number of trials tends to infinity. In an infinite universe (and, obviously, in the multiverse) with 
a finite number of histories, the infinite number of trials is realized, hence probability equals 
frequency. The probability of any permissible history including origin of life, then, is P = 1. 
However, the probability p of observing any particular history in a given O-region lies in the 
interval between 0 and 1 as in the textbook definition of probability and can be extremely small 
for a vast number of histories including the origin of life. Thus, the notions of chance and 
randomness apply only to finite regions of a universe, whereas in an infinite universe as a whole, 
the realization of all permitted histories is a necessity.
Anthropic principle/anthropic selection/
anthropic reasoning
The notion that the history of our world (our O-region, our galaxy, our solar system etc) prior to 
the onset of biological evolution does not depend on any special "mechanism" but was, simply, 
"selected" from the finite ensemble of all histories that are guaranteed to realize in an infinite 
universe, by virtue of being conducive to the emergence of complex life. Anthropic selection is an 
epistemological not an ontological principle, and should not be misconstrued for any kind of 
active process. This is a formulation of the "weak" anthropic principle adopted for the context of 
this paper. The "strong" anthropic principle is the notion that the emergence of consciousness, 
somehow, is a goal of the cosmic history. This is a teleological, non-scientific concept.Biology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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translation such that the earliest stage of life's evolution
was a versatile community of replicating RNA molecules
[21-23]. A central element of the RNA world is a replicase
consisting of RNA. The RNA world concept is supported
by the experimental discovery of diverse catalytic activities
of ribozymes (catalytic RNAs) [24-27]. However, all the
advances of ribozymology notwithstanding, the prospects
of a bona fide ribozyme replicase remain dim as the
ribozymes designed for that purposes are capable, at best,
of the addition of ~10 nucleotides to a oligonucleotide
primer, at a very slow rate and with fidelity at least an
order magnitude below that required for the replication of
relatively long RNA molecules [28,29]. As recently noticed
by one of the leading RNA world explorers, "Despite val-
iant efforts,...it appears unlikely that this particular
polymerase enzyme will ever be evolved to the point that
it can copy RNA molecules as long as itself (~200 nucle-
otides)" [30]. Of course, it remains possible – and this is,
indeed, the belief in the RNA world community – that
other ribozymes are eventually evolved to that level; how-
ever, the evidence is lacking.
The second paradox of OORT pertains to the origin of the
translation system from within the RNA world via a Dar-
winian evolutionary process: until the translation system
produces functional proteins, there is no obvious selective
advantage to the evolution of any parts of this elaborate
(even in its most primitive form) molecular machine.
Conceptually, this paradox is closely related to the general
problem of the evolution of complex systems that was
first recognized by Darwin in his famous discussion of the
evolution of the eye [16]. The solution sketched by Dar-
win centered around the evolutionary refinement of a
primitive version of the function of the complex organ;
subsequently, the importance of the exaptation route for
the evolution of complex systems has been realized [18].
However, origin of translation resists both lines of reason-
ing. Primitive translation in a protein-free system is con-
ceivable as an intermediate stage of evolution (see below)
but this does not resolve the paradox because, even for
that form of translation to function, the core components
must have been in place already. Speculative scenarios
have been developed on the basis of the idea that even
short peptides could provide selective advantage to an
evolving system in the RNA world by stabilizing RNA
molecules, affecting their conformations or enhancing
their catalytic activities [31-33] (see Ref. [34] for an
attempt of a synthesis on this direction in the study of
translation origins). These ideas are compatible with
observed effects of peptides on ribozyme activity [35] but
none of the scenarios is complete or supported by any spe-
cific evidence, and all include reactions without precedent
in modern biological or model systems.
All this is not to suggest that OORT is a problem of "irre-
ducible complexity" and that the systems of replication
and translation could not emerge by means of biological
evolution. It remains possible that a compelling evolu-
tionary scenario is eventually developed and, perhaps,
validated experimentally. However, it is clear that OORT
is not just the hardest problem in all of evolutionary biol-
ogy but one that is qualitatively distinct from the rest. For
all other problems, the basis of biological evolution,
genome replication, is in place but, in the case of OORT,
the emergence of this mechanism itself is the explanan-
dum. Thus, it is of interest to consider radically different
scenarios for OORT.
The transition from anthropic selection to biological 
evolution in the history of life and the no-RNA-World 
scenario
The history of life includes a crucial transition from chance
to biological evolution (Fig. 1). Biological evolution can-
not take off before there are polymers (most likely, RNA
molecules) and means for their sustainable replication.
Thus, the synthesis of nucleotides and (at least) moderate-
sized polynucleotides could not have evolved biologically
and must have emerged abiogenically, i.e., effectively, by
chance abetted by chemical selection, e.g., preferential
survival of stable RNA species. At the other end of the
spectrum, there can be no reasonable doubt that the first
cells were brought about by biological evolution. Some-
where in between is the transition, the threshold of bio-
logical evolution. Most often, since the advent of the RNA
World concept, this threshold is (implicitly) linked to the
emergence of replicating RNA molecules. Translation is
thought to have evolved later via an unspecified or, at
best, invented ad hoc selective process. As discussed in the
preceding section, both the ribozyme-catalyzed replica-
tion and, especially, evolution of translation in the RNA
world face formidable difficulties. The MWO model dra-
matically expands the interval on the axis of organiza-
tional complexity where the threshold can belong by
making emergence of complexity attainable by chance
(Fig. 1). In this framework, the possibility that the break-
through stage for the onset of biological evolution was a
high-complexity state, i.e., that the core of the coupled
system of translation-replication emerged by chance, can-
not be dismissed, however unlikely (i.e., extremely rare in
the multiverse).
The MWO model not only permits but guarantees that,
somewhere in the infinite multiverse – moreover, in every
single infinite universe, – such a system would emerge.
The pertinent question is whether or not this is the most
likely breakthrough stage the appearance of which on
earth would be explained by chance and anthropic selec-
tion. I suggest that such a possibility should be taken seri-
ously, given the paradoxes of OORT. A central corollary toBiology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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this hypothesis is that the RNA World, as it is currently
pictured, i.e., a vast community of replicating RNA mole-
cules possessing a variety of catalytic activities but no
translation system and no genetically encoded proteins,
might have never existed. Of course, as discussed below,
this does not at all rule out the special importance of
ribozymes in early biology, in particular, in the primor-
dial translation system.
The modern translation apparatus shows clear signs of
evolution by duplication and diversification in the essen-
tial, ubiquitous components, allowing one to glean some
features of the putative breakthrough system. Analysis of
the duplications of key proteins involved in translation
suggests that the breakthrough system was an RNA-based
machine, to a much greater extent than the modern trans-
lation system. Specifically, the aminoacyl-tRNA syn-
thetases (aaRS) comprise two unrelated classes each of
which evolved via a series of duplications[36,37]. Moreo-
ver, both classes of paralogous aaRS are relatively late
elaborations within large classes of nucleotidases [38-40],
strongly suggesting that the breakthrough system acti-
vated amino acids via an RNA-only mechanism. The same
pertains to the translation factors that are relatively late
products of evolution within the GTPase class of the P-
loop NTPases; thus, the breakthrough system would not
employ protein translation factors [41]. The phenomenon
of mimicking of tRNA structures by some of the transla-
tion factors [42-44] further supports the notion that the
ancestral translation system was RNA-centered. The exper-
imentally demonstrated activities of ribozymes include,
among others, those that are involved in the main chemi-
cal steps of translation, such as amino acid activation,
RNA aminoacylation, and peptidyl transfer [45-48]. Self-
The transition from chance/anthropic selection to biological evolution in the history of life Figure 1
The transition from chance/anthropic selection to biological evolution in the history of life. The grey area and dotted lines illus-
trate the uncertainty in the identification of the threshold of biological evolution, i.e., the level of complexity at which the tran-
sition occurred. The broken red line denotes the boundary between the levels of complexity that, in principle, might be 
attainable in a finite universe consisting of a single O-region from the higher levels of complexity the spontaneous emergence of 
which would require an infinite model such as the MWO (see Appendix).
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aminoacylation of ribozymes selected for this activity is
rapid and highly accurate, remarkably, even more so than
the same reaction catalyzed by the cognate aaRS [49]. Per-
haps, most importantly, the large subunit rRNA itself is a
ribozyme that catalyzes the peptidyl transferase reaction
[50,51]. Thus, an RNA-only translation system, although
so far not demonstrated experimentally [52], appears to
be a realistic possibility.
A notable and enigmatic feature of the modern translation
machinery is the common structure and the presence of
conserved sequence elements in the tRNAs of all specifici-
ties which suggests that all the tRNAs are ancient para-
logs[53]. Thus, the current set of tRNAs, obviously, is a
product of biological evolution. The breakthrough sys-
tem, conceivably, would utilize adaptors that were sim-
pler than tRNAs, with the latter taking over already at the
biological evolution stage. These primordial adaptors
would have to possess the crucial capacity that, in the
modern translation system, belongs to aaRS, i.e., combin-
ing amino acids with the cognate anticodons [34].
Under the present model, the core elements of the trans-
lation system, namely, a RNA-only ribosome and the spe-
cific adaptors for, at least, a subset of the 20 modern
protein amino acids emerged by chance and were
anthropically selected (Fig. 2). The breakthrough system
was a primitive, RNA-based translation machine that was
capable of translating exogenous RNAs such that func-
tional proteins, including a replicase, could be generated.
The presence of a diversity of randomly synthesized RNAs,
including one that encoded a protein with a replicase
activity (however low, initially), on the early earth would
be another anthropically selected feature. For such an
The upper bound for the putative breakthrough system: a primitive, RNA-based coupled system of replication-translation Figure 2
The upper bound for the putative breakthrough system: a primitive, RNA-based coupled system of replication-translation. LSU, 
large ribosomal subunit; SSU, small ribosomal subunit.
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ensemble of RNA molecules to exist, a natural "reactor" is
required in which polynucleotides are produced at an ade-
quate rate and chemical selection occurs such that stable
molecules survive longer. Networks of inorganic compart-
ments existing at hydrothermal vents might be plausible
candidates for this role [54,55]. Interestingly, a recent
study that combined simulation and experiment has
shown that even a low rate of production of mononucle-
otides would lead to their significant concentration in the
peripheral compartments of such networks, and should
polynucleotide be formed, they could reach very high
concentrations [56]. Thus, the existence of "RNA-making
reactors" under prebiotic conditions could be quite realis-
tic [57].
Under these conditions, the emergence of RNA-based
translation machinery would lead to the production of
the replicase, and, with the ensuing RNA replication, the
fundamental transition from anthropic to biological
selection would occur (Fig. 2). In principle, the start of
biological evolution is imaginable with the replicase ini-
tially being the only active protein. However, given the
requirement for a RNA-producing "reactor", it seems an
attractive possibility that, upon the advent of translation,
other random RNA sequences gave rise to prototypes of
the other major protein folds, yielding several protein
activities (e.g., RNA-binding proteins or primitive
enzymes facilitating nucleotide synthesis) and so confer-
ring the minimal required robustness to the emerging bio-
logical system. The emergence of these folds would
comprise the "Big Bang" of the protein universe [39,58].
The modern, universal genetic code is much more robust
than expected by chance with respect to mutational and,
probably, also translational errors: it has been estimated
that the probability to obtain a code with the same or
greater robustness than the actual one is <10-6 [59-61].
This robustness is manifest in the non-randomness of the
code structure such that amino acids with similar proper-
ties are, typically, encoded by codons that differ in a single
position (e.g., all codons with a U in the second position
encode hydrophobic amino acids) [62]. This is, typically,
considered to be a result of evolutionary optimization of
the code [60]. However, the MWO model suggests an
alternative view under which the basic structure of the
code results from anthropic selection inasmuch as only
codes with a certain minimal level of robustness would
allow the appearance of a functional replicase in the
breakthrough system. Of course, this scenario for the
emergence of the code does not preclude subsequent
adjustments via biological evolution.
The proposal outlined above eliminates the paradoxes of
OORT by postulating that replication and translation, in
their most basic forms, have not evolved biologically but
rather were brought about by chance abetted with
anthropic selection. The MWO model seems to render this
a viable, however counterintuitive, possibility.
Objections, implications, and falsification
The present proposal, the appearance, via anthropic selec-
tion alone, of a RNA-protein system sufficiently complex
to couple translation with replication such that biological
evolution could take off, might seem quite outrageous.
However, there are several mitigating considerations.
First, the postulated chance origin of the replication-trans-
lation system does not require any mysterious processes.
On the contrary, the only reactions involved are regular
ones, such as polymerization of nucleotides and amino
acids, nucleotide phosphorylation/dephosphorylation
etc, and the only interactions required are those that are
common in chemistry and biochemistry. Interestingly,
the elementary reactions required for translation (amino
acid activation, RNA aminoacylation, and transpeptida-
tion) are relatively easily modeled with ribozymes (see
above), in a marked contrast to RNA replication. Second,
any conceivable scenario of life's evolution necessarily
requires combinations of highly unlikely conditions and
events prior to the onset of biological evolution, including
the abiogenic synthesis of fairly complex and not particu-
larly stable organic molecules, such as nucleotides, the
concentration of these molecules within appropriate com-
partments, and their polymerization yielding polynucle-
otides of sufficient size and diversity. Thus, anthropic
selection appears to be an inevitable aspect of life's evolu-
tion (Fig. 1).
Here I invoke the MWO model to argue that the range of
complexity that is open to anthropic selection could be
much greater than previously suspected such that a prim-
itive coupled replication-translation system might have
emerged without biological selection (Fig. 1). This sce-
nario seems to eliminate the paradoxes of OORT. The ori-
gin of a complex system capable of performing a
biological function by chance might appear nonsensical. I
believe, however, that this is, primarily, a semantic trap.
Prior to the onset of biological evolution, there could be
no function, just complexity, and the emergence of any
level of complexity is guaranteed by the MWO model.
A crucial aspect of the framework developed here is
brought about by a disturbing (almost nightmarish) but
inevitable question: in the infinitely redundant world of
MWO, why is biological evolution, and in particular, Dar-
winian selection relevant at all? Is it not possible for any,
even the highest degree of complexity to emerge by
chance? The answer is "yes" but the question misses the
point. Under the MWO model, emergence of an infinite
number of complex biotas by chance is inevitable but
these would be vastly less common than those thatBiology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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evolved by the scenario that includes the switch from
chance/anthropic selection to biological evolution. The
onset of biological evolution canalizes the historical proc-
ess by reducing the number of available trajectories to the
relatively few robust ones that are compatible with the
Darwinian mode of evolution of complex systems (Fig.
3). This leads to a much greater rate of change than achiev-
able by chance such that, as soon as there is an opportu-
nity for biological evolution to take off, anthropic
selection is relegated to a secondary role in the history of
life. Of course, "secondary" does not mean unimportant;
contingency and randomness are crucial, especially, at
transitional stages of evolution (e.g., [63,64] but the basic
framework is Darwinian. Thus, in any reconstruction of
the origin of life, the threshold should be mapped to the
lowest possible point, i.e., to the minimally complex sys-
tem capable of biological evolution.
The strong form of the present hypothesis, i.e., the notion
that the breakthrough stage in the history of life was a
primitive coupled replication-translation system (Fig. 2),
is falsifiable. Such a system should be construed as the
upper bound of complexity for the breakthrough stage
(Fig. 1). As soon as the possibility of biological evolution
at a lower level of complexity, e.g., in the RNA world, is
demonstrated and the route from the RNA world to the
translation system is established, either experimentally or,
at least, in a compelling model, the origin of a complex
system with coupled replication and translation by
chance/anthropic selection will be, effectively, ruled out.
A demonstration that life independently emerged on sev-
eral planets in our O-region will have the same effect. In
the Appendix, I provide a rough, toy calculation of the
upper bound of the probability of the emergence of a cou-
pled replication-translation system in an O-region – this
probability is, indeed, vanishingly small. The converse
prediction is that any life forms that might be discovered
on Mars or, perhaps, Europa during future planetary
explorations will have a common origin with life on earth.
Any of the above falsifications will refute the model
shown in Fig. 2 but will not make the MWO worldview
irrelevant for our understanding of the origin of life.
Indeed, any such discovery (tremendously important in
itself) will simply lower the threshold of biological evolu-
tion on the scale in Figure 1. This point can be illustrated
by deliberately naïve, toy calculations of the upper bound
of the probability of the emergence of different versions of
the breakthrough system by chance. In the Appendix, I
present such calculations for two versions, the RNA World
with a ribozyme replicase, and the coupled translation-
replication system. Under the assumptions of this toy
model (idealized to the extreme in that an unrealistically
high rate of abiogenic RNA production is assumed), the
emergence, by chance, of a ribozyme replicase in a finite
universe consisting of a single O-region like ours, in prin-
ciple, could be considered. However, any significant
increase in complexity would call for a different cosmo-
logical model. In particular, the emergence of a coupled
replication-translation system is unlikely to the extent of
being, effectively, impossible. For such a complex system
to be a viable candidate for the breakthrough stage, an
infinite multiiverse, such as the one depicted by MWO or,
in the very least, a universe with a vast number of O-
regions, is, indeed, a must.
Of course, the most straightforward and powerful falsifi-
cation would be to disprove the MWO itself. Here, how-
ever, an important disclaimer is due. It is not, actually,
crucial for the validity of the conceptual framework pre-
sented here that MWO is correct in all its details. Only two
rather generic assumptions are essential: i) a spatially infi-
nite universe such as any (island) universe in MWO; the
multiverse, while integral to eternal inflation, is not actu-
ally required for my argument, ii) the finiteness of the
number of macroscopic histories in any finite region of
spacetime. The strong form of the hypothesis presented
here will not be falsified if some specific details of the
MWO turn out to be wrong but only if one of these gen-
eral assumptions fails.
Conclusion
Despite considerable experimental and theoretical effort,
no compelling scenarios currently exist for the origin of
replication and translation, the key processes that together
comprise the core of biological systems and the apparent
pre-requisite of biological evolution. The RNA World con-
The narrowing of the range of possible histories and the  increased likelihood of the emergence of high complexity  brought about by the transition from chance to biological  evolution Figure 3
The narrowing of the range of possible histories and the 
increased likelihood of the emergence of high complexity 
brought about by the transition from chance to biological 
evolution. The thick read arrow shows the history that leads 
to the breakthrough system.
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cept might offer the best chance for the resolution of this
conundrum but so far cannot adequately account for the
emergence of an efficient RNA replicase or the translation
system.
The MWO version of the cosmological model of eternal
inflation could suggest a way out of this conundrum
because, in an infinite multiverse with a finite number of
distinct macroscopic histories (each repeated an infinite
number of times), emergence of even highly complex sys-
tems by chance is not just possible but inevitable. This
dramatically expands the interval on the scale of organiza-
tional complexity where the transition from anthropic
selection to biological evolution might belong. Specifi-
cally, it becomes conceivable that the minimal require-
ment (the breakthrough stage) for the onset of biological
evolution is a primitive coupled replication-translation
system that emerged by chance. That this extremely rare
event occurred on earth and gave rise to life as we know it
is explained by anthropic selection alone. Under this
model, a full-fledged RNA world, with a diverse popula-
tion of replicating RNA molecules but without transla-
tion, was not a stage in the origin of life on earth.
However, this does not defy the central role of RNA in the
emergence of biological evolution and early evolution of
life. Indeed, the model includes a complex ensemble of
non-replicating RNA molecules as the product of
anthropic selection that enabled the onset of biological
evolution.
Connections between biological evolution and cosmolog-
ical models have been proposed previously as analogies.
Shakhnovich and coworkers developed a simple mathe-
matical model of an "expanding" protein universe that
they aptly likened to the Big Bang model of the evolution
of the physical universe [58]. From the cosmological side,
Smolin proposed the model of cosmic selection that
extended the Darwinian principles to the evolution of the
universe[65,66]. By contrast, here I propose a direct link
between specific models of evolution of the physical and
biological universes, with the latter being contingent on
the validity of the former (MWO) as illustrated by simple
calculations. Importantly, in this context, the validity of
MWO is to be understood in a rather generic sense. For the
present concept to hold, the only essential assumptions
are that the universe is infinite [e.g., any (island) universe
under MWO; the multiverse, per se, is not a must] and that
the number of macroscopic histories in any finite region
of spacetime is finite.
A final comment on "irreducible complexity" and "intelli-
gent design". By showing that highly complex systems,
actually, can emerge by chance and, moreover, are inevi-
table, if extremely rare, in the universe, the present model
sidesteps the issue of irreducibility and leaves no room
whatsoever for any form of intelligent design.
Reviewers' comments
Reviewer 1: Eric Bapteste (Université Pierre et Marie 
Curie)
I might be strange but I often like to read Eugene Koonin's
papers. This one, about the origin of replication and trans-
lation mechanisms within a particular cosmological
framework, is vastly metaphysical. Biologists might appre-
ciate that it addresses the limits of application of classical
evolutionary thinking to early life stages in a pretty origi-
nal way. Developing rigorous metaphysical arguments –
especially when dealing with cosmological scenarios- is
however very tedious. It probably requires a solid philo-
sophical background to be done convincingly, and most
likely the collaboration of both evolutionists and philos-
ophers to write such an ambitious manuscript. A collabo-
ration of that kind would help clarifying the meaning of
many of the terms used and help presenting what special-
ists of the field consider to be the important notions and
issues in cosmology, possibly coupled with a fair intro-
duction for biologists about the alternative cosmological
main models.
In my short review of this paper, I will assume that,
although there is no doubt Eugene Koonin is a very bright
evolutionist and a powerful thinker, he can not be consid-
ered as an expert on cosmology. For this reason (maybe),
I feel that, if there are positive aspects in this manuscript,
there are also important sources of concerns in it.
Author's response: There are a great many issues touched
upon in this not so short review, and replying in full would,
effectively, take another paper. Furthermore, to write such a
paper properly, one might indeed need to be (or closely collabo-
rate with) a professional philosopher. I will therefore restrict
myself to a few brief comments on specific points, and a closing
statement on the relationships between physics and metaphys-
ics, and between the Anthropic Principle and Intelligent
Design; additional relevant discussion can be found in my
response to Krakauer below.
As a researcher, I welcome the multiplication of alterna-
tive scenarios (metaphysical – when coherent- or scien-
tific) to address scientific questions. This pluralistic
approach is probably the best way to test our favourite sci-
entific theories by challenging them, in any case to keep
them alive and debated.
Eugene Koonin's present appeal to cosmology in order to
address a complex evolutionary issue tells me that, as a
scientist, he feels that there is currently a problem with the
scientific theory aiming to explain the origin of replica-
tion and translation. In other words, his approach saysBiology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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something both about him and about the possible limits
of our discipline on that topic. In this review, I will simply
try to rephrase what serious problem Koonin has identi-
fied according to me, and I will argue that I am afraid his
answer to this problem might open too broad an avenue
to the supporters of intelligent design, as it is currently for-
mulated, and thus does not satisfy me as such as an alter-
native to the theory to the RNA world.
Koonin's problem and solution
Koonin's problem (the central problem of biology, he
claims! (cf.p.6)) is that traditional evolutionary models
can not help conceiving the emergence of replication and
translation systems: for him, they would be too complex
to have evolved independently of a primordial replica-
tion-translation system by natural selection acting on
ribozymes alone. To solve this issue, Koonin proposes
that a coupled complex system of translation and replica-
tion emerged instead by chance and by anthropic selec-
tion. After what he assumes that Darwinian selection took
off and that the traditional evolutionary thinking can be
applied safely to analyse the rest of the biological evolu-
tion.
To overcome the fact that the likelihood of the emergence
of a complex system by chance alone is low, Koonin's
multiplies the universes where such a phenomenon could
be observed. Although some event e is deemed to be rare
in one universe, in a multiverse framework, there must be
one universe where such e happened. In his own terms:
"spontaneous emergence of complex systems that would
have to be considered virtually impossible in a finite uni-
verse becomes not only possible but inevitable under
MWO, even though the prior probabilities of the vast
majority of histories to occur in a given O-region are van-
ishingly small" (p. 6).
This position raises itself many concerns (biological and
philosophical):
- Is it really true that traditional natural selection could
not explain the emergence of the replication and transla-
tion systems?
- In any case, why should we assume that the emergence
of translation and replication had to be coupled in the
first place? Would not it simplify the "central problem"
(i.e. make one of these questions amenable to classical
evolutionary thinking) if both of these issues were uncou-
pled? For instance, assuming replication evolved first,
could not it be possible that translation evolved progres-
sively under Darwinian selection?
- Is a transition from anthropic selection to Darwinian
selection possible and likely?
- Is it possible to assume such a transition without taking
the high risk to reintroduce teleology everywhere in the
evolutionary field?
Deeply, I agree with Koonin that explaining the origin of
replication cycles in general challenges any sort of think-
ing based on natural selection and goes beyond the classi-
cal evolutionary theory, in the sense that Darwinian
evolution needs replication to happen and evolutionists
need replication cycles (and descent) to reason. Explain-
ing the origin/cause of the phenomenon of replication is
thus a big problem. Yet, I disagree with Koonin that natu-
ral selection and cycles of replication have to happen late
in the cosmological history. To me it (only) takes a popu-
lation of imperfect replicators of whatever nature for the
natural selection to act, and some models on early life sug-
gest how molecules, crystals of some sort could replicate
on different inorganic substrates. Once replication is in
place, and from a traditional selectionist perspective, it
does not seem impossible that emerges a biological sys-
tem of minimal complexity from which the process of
biological replication itself could evolve under natural
selection. In other words, I would locate the so-called
"central" problem one step earlier than Koonin does in
his manuscript: if we (evolutionists) were asked to explain
replication in general, we might get in trouble, and we
might be seriously tempted by metaphysical arguments.
Koonin bravely tries to tackle such a deep conceptual
issue, using metaphysics where, according to him, science
does not seem to work, but I am afraid his present (and
arguable) solution, although fairly underlining one of the
limits of traditional evolutionary thinking, could open a
huge door to the tenants of intelligent design.
My general issues with the manuscript
Philosophy or biology or both?
At various locations, precisions are needed to allow a real 
understanding of the first (cosmological) section of the paper
Maybe because my background in both biology and phi-
losophy is limited (I have a phD in both), I have a general
issue with several parts of the manuscript, which should
be either more rigorously developed or should be signifi-
cantly shortened. At the very least, I believe that to be truly
understood the author must propose -very early in his
manuscript- clear definitions (in a box, or in the main
text) of the following terms:
Cosmology, probable, possible, multiverse, anthropic
selection, Darwinian selection.
Author's response: I took up this suggestion and included
some of such key definitions in a Box. There was no need to
define Darwinian selection, in my opinion, but the less com-Biology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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mon key notions, and those common ones that are reinterpreted
here are defined.
He can not just assume that every reader shares his con-
ceptions of the meaning of these different notions. He
should also clarify what in biology are "macroscopic his-
tories" by giving biological examples of it. In general, he
should make clear when he is using a word in its philo-
sophical sense or in its more common meaning. For
instance, I am not sure what Koonin means by "repeated"
in his sentence: "each history permitted by conservation
laws of physics is repeated an infinite number of times in
the multiverse" (p. 5). Does he mean each history is dupli-
cated, exactly identical, an infinite number of times (i.e.
the very same organism reoccurred in the very same con-
text endlessly)? Depending on what the source informing
his opinion was (philosophical or not), there might be a
possible confusion. Indeed for the process-philosophers
(who come to my mind and who have tried to develop a
cosmology), repetition never means repetition of the
same, but all the time repetition of something different
(see Deleuze for instance).
Author's response: Let us be clear: not a single term in this
paper is used in any specific philosophical meaning. The cosmo-
logical models and concepts discussed here are physics not met-
aphysics, even as they have important philosophical
implications (see my response at the end of this review for a
more general discussion).
First major concern: should we reintroduce teleological processes to 
explain what can not be explained by natural selection?
Biological systems replicate, yet Koonin tells us we can not
know how they happen to do it in the first place and that
we need to seek for an answer outside of the realm of tra-
ditional evolutionary thinking to address this question.
He calls in multiverse and anthropic selection.
I have particular trouble with this second notion.
If Koonin really wants to promote the anthropic principle
the way he defines it – ("According to the anthropic prin-
ciple, the only "reason" our O-region has its specific
parameters is that, otherwise, there would be no observers
to peer into the universe", p.5)-, he seems to be assuming
no less than a major role for teleology to explain life bio-
diversity (namely here that the evolution of observers to
peer into the universe is the root cause of evolution). In
general, teleology means that processes are directed by
their goal-to-be-achieved, that their real causation is the
later consequence the structures developed in the evolu-
tionary process will lead to. It certainly makes sense in a
context of replication (like descent with modification and
natural selection) that a selected effect (i.e. the possession
of a phenotype) can act as a cause on the evolution of
future organisms of the same lineage (i.e. if the develop-
ment of an eye fulfils a function of perception, therefore it
can be selected if it increases the fitness of perceptive
organisms in the population). However, assuming that
teleology is acting before the replication process and nat-
ural selection are started is equivalent to assume that there
is an a priori reason for which there has to be one day, on
earth, organisms with eyes, whose goal will be to see.
Unfortunately, such a position does not distinguish itself
from the conception of the supporters of intelligent
design either. ID people could always claim that life
evolves for a reason (they could also enrole Darwinian
selection as a mean to achieve this higher goal/reason).
Thus, I want to precise that I do not see what's really
brought in by invoking such an "anthropic principle" (but
trouble). The idea that evolution would be oriented
toward consciousness is a recurrent cosmological option
indeed but it is definitely not the only one possible, and
certainly not mine. A deeper philosophical exploration of
cosmological theories would most likely have showed
that evolutionists do not have to embrace a strong
anthropic principle as if it was an integral part of the cos-
mological package introduced here (too roughly) by
Koonin.
Yet, maybe Koonin himself does not care so much for this
anthropic principle, as I suggest below.
Author's response: this is a very, very serious misunderstand-
ing of the anthropic principle. The idea that anything is "ori-
ented toward consciousness" is pernicious nonsense. The revised
version of the paper includes a brief debunking of the so-called
"strong anthropic principle", in response to this unfortunate
misstatement and a similar one made by Krakauer. I have to be
frank here: to me, this mistake invalidates much (not all) of the
critique in the review. There is no teleology at all involved in my
approach in this paper. No teleology. It is the opposite of teleol-
ogy. More on this in my closing response to Bapteste.
Second concern: assuming Koonin's model, are there strong evidence 
of the transition from anthropic selection to Darwinian selection?
Koonin thinks that anthropic selection is inevitably
replaced by Darwinian selection once a sufficiently effi-
cient mechanism of replication/translation has been put
together. Thanks to such a transition, the teleological
order of things would thus be replaced by the Darwinian
order of things, under the action of natural selection. (In
other words, once his problem is solved, Koonin does not
need alternative models to evolutionary thinking any-
more). Unfortunately, as long as he does not carefully
introduce and clarify his anthropic selection principle, I
think that he might be unwillingly opening a huge door
to ID supporters to enter into the very heart of the evolu-
tionary theory.Biology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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What guarantee do we have indeed that Darwinian selec-
tion would replace anthropic selection?
What guarantee do we have that some anthropic selection
would not persist, having some effects on the living world,
although of lesser importance than those of Darwinian
selection? What guarantee do we have that it would not be
still acting on and then be responsible, here and there, for
some lucky natural "miracles"? (i.e. the birth of a pan-
demic, a spontaneous generation, a benevolent mutation
for superior organisms, any kind of oddities (toward con-
sciousness), since after all the anthropic principle does
not say if the observers to peer (that peer? peering?) into
the universe have to come sooner rather than later, does
it?) ?
Author's response: Again, there is absolutely no teleology
involved, I could not insist more strongly on this point. Beyond
that, however, we certainly cannot have a guarantee that the
anthropic principle was not involved in subsequent evolution
because it definitely was. Certainly, in the context of the infi-
nite multiverse, there is an enormous number of worlds where
eukaryotes have never evolved...or animals etc. The history of
life is riddled with contingency, and there is nothing new about
this notion. Not that I am so keen to rely on authority but lead-
ing scholars of evolution from Jacob to Monod to Gould advo-
cated the importance of contingency with great force. Gould's
metaphor of rewinding the tape of evolution – and finding that
even major events would not be the same – is, perhaps, most
vivid. A prominent philosopher, Dan Dennett, also wrote about
this in "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" and even claimed that evo-
lution is governed by deterministic chaos. An unsettling descrip-
tion, perhaps, but essentially true, I believe. Thus, the anthropic
principle remains relevant throughout the history of life
although, after the breakthrough stage (see Figs. 1 and 3), it is,
largely, subjugated by the Darwinian process. I included a brief
comment to this effect in the revised manuscript.
Worse: what guarantee do we have that there won't be ID
people to claim that, as the very important evolutionary
biologist E. Koonin showed, Darwinian selection is a sec-
ondary player in cosmology, and is itself a force evolved
for a reason, a chosen by product of anthropic selection,
in which case everything evolving under Darwinian selec-
tion evolves in fact under the eternal drive of the
anthropic principle? (As I read it, in this paper Koonin did
not prove that anthropic principle and natural selection
were not working hands in hands, and that the later was
not following the former for a reason of higher order).
For all these questions could be exploited very meanly by
ID people, Koonin is in my view very naïve to think that
he can call in teleology to start the process of evolution
and call it off subsequently: if teleology is called in (a view
which I doubt is worth supporting in science and that I
feel is dangerous), unless teleology achieves the goal it is
needed for, there is no reason why teleology should sud-
denly stop being relevant in the middle of the way... In
fact, a teleological process deemed to be non successful is
no more a force, as by definition it will fail to achieve its
goal, and then why to invoke it as a force in the first
place?)
Does Koonin really want to claim that "the basic structure
of the [genetic] code results from anthropic selection in as
much as only codes with a certain minimal level of robust-
ness would allow the appearance of a functional replicase
in the breakthrough system" (p.13), and take the risk to be
badly misinterpreted? Obviously, he is smart enough to
foresee this kind of problems and the reason why he
claims he does not worry about it (p.18) is perhaps that
this kind of "anthropic selection" is not really what he has
in mind.
Third concern: is our world Koonin's brave new world?
Maybe, instead of invoking such a strong anthropic selec-
tion, Koonin is arguing along much simpler lines. I sus-
pect he is in fact introducing a model from which
teleology could be entirely absent to justify that, if every-
thing with a low probability is possible somewhere, even
though it has a low probability in a given universe, pro-
viding a high enough number of universes, everything -
including the oddest phenomena- becomes necessary
somewhere. Then, complex structures for replication have
to emerge. By chance, we happened to be in the "right"
type of universe where this very emergence took place,
says Koonin. It is just maths: the initial paradox can be
solved by an axiom: it had to be so or we would not be
here to tell. Now, some people (me included) might find
this position to overcome the paradoxical origin of repli-
cation a little bit dry (and panglossian).
Author's response: So Bapteste, after all, understands what I
am trying to say. Is the whole basis of the criticism above the
mistaken identification of anthropic principle with its ridicu-
lous strong version? Very regrettable if so. In the revised manu-
script, I stress this point in the text and in the Box. Hopefully,
this eliminates any cause for confusion. Now, whether or not
the concept developed here is dry is, of course, just a matter of
taste. However, the characterization of my position as "Panglos-
sian" cries for a comment. I believe that the worldview pre-
sented here is, actually, anti-Panglossian. Indeed, in an infinite
multiverse with a finite number of histories, there is no chance
that we live in the best of all possible worlds. There is an infinite
number of worlds that are incomparably better, even those
where Elvis is still alive in 2007 as wryly noticed by Garriga
and Vilenkin (refs. 1 and 2). Thus, I believe that here I am rel-
egating Dr. Pangloss to irrelevance, continuing along the lines
of Gould and Lewontin's famous San Marco paper.Biology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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Especially if this kind of claim is applied again and again
to several complex problems we are (and we will be) fac-
ing. As Koonin notices, even if it is unlikely, one could
indeed propose that the whole life organization of a uni-
verse is just the necessary outcome of such a model. That's
why in his paper, a central question subsequently
becomes to decide up to which point complex life phe-
nomena to be explained on our planet were necessary
rather than the result of Darwinian selection (i.e. at which
point traditional scientific explanations become valid
again). Regarding that issue, Koonin takes a strong posi-
tion: when the conditions for Darwinian selection are sat-
isfied (namely once biological replication and translation
systems have been set up), necessity leaves our world.
(Someone with a different "central" problem might thus
observe that, when Koonin does not need necessity any-
more to play the role of the explanans of his own biolog-
ical problem, he drops it; yet maybe another "central"
problem still challenges traditional evolutionary think-
ing, should we invoke the necessity and the mutiverse for
it one more time?).
If what I described is what Koonin had in mind rather
than the anthropic selection, the good news then is that
since such necessity is strictly supported by statistics, he
can propose that things are the way they are because they
had to be so, without needing to invoke observers of the
universe and to open the door of evolutionary biology to
ID people.
Author's response: I appreciate these points. The wording in
the original manuscript was unnecessarily rigid, in an attempt
to strongly emphasize the transition. I made modifications to
acknowledge the important role of contingency at subsequent
stages of evolution as well.
Yet, scientists could wonder if this principle position (use
necessity when the Darwinian model does not apply, else
use the Darwinian model) is the only and best null
hypothesis to deal with issues regarding early life. They
could notably question:
- how much time is needed for everything to happen
somewhere in the multiverse (and if this is a realistic time
line from our human perspective),
- if this multiverse scenario is significantly more likely
than chance events on a single universe,
- if it is that impossible for populations of ribozymes to be
self-sustaining and self-replicating?
Koonin tries to address these questions with some toy sta-
tistical models, yet I am very skeptical that toy probability
calculations can prove decisive in that matter. (For
instance, Whitehead's cosmology (a solid philosophical
reference but not an easy read) talks a lot about societies
and populations, nexus of all kinds of elements, which
could have emergent properties, and could offer interest-
ing breakthroughs, the probabilities of which are proba-
bly impossible to derive mathematically).
To summarize, it is legitimate that Koonin tells us where
he feels comfortable applying traditional evolutionary
thinking. It is legitimate that he tries to propose possible
explanations to go beyond that limit. Yet, I am not con-
vinced that there is more than intuition in this paper and
that he could prove that our world (the explanandum) is
the brave new world he, as a scientist, would be happy
with.
I am thus interested -and amused- that, in this paper,
Koonin ends up multiplying the universes to solve a bio-
logical issue, when I remember how much, on other occa-
sions, he enjoys to invoke parsimony (the assumption
that one should not multiply beings without necessity). I
would be more satisfied however when he would have
made his own views on ID and the anthropic principle
clearer in a revised version of this manuscript.
Author's response: Considering the main points of Bapteste's
comment, I believe I need to summarize my position on three
issues: i) physics versus metaphysics, ii) the nature of the
anthropic principle, iii) the relation of the present concept to
Intelligent Design (ID). Obviously, the first point can be dis-
cussed at great length, so I will just say it a nutshell. The con-
cept developed here is a purely scientific one, positioned at the
interface of physical cosmology and straightforward evolution-
ary biology. If some aspects of the paper seem unusual and
counterintuitive, that is mainly because such are the key fea-
tures of the MWO model. Of course, the MWO model has pro-
found philosophical (both metaphysical and epistemological)
implications (see refs. 2 and 13 for discussion), and the biolog-
ical implication developed here has additional ones. There is
nothing unique in this: when the fundamental aspects of the
structure of the world are concerned, physics and philosophy
merge. In the most obvious example, foundational research in
quantum physics had been like that for the last 80 years.
I have already made several statements on the anthropic prin-
ciple above, but I think a more definitive brief explanation
should be useful. Once again, we deal here only with the weak
anthropic principle that has nothing to do with any teleology.
Moreover, it is a fairly trivial statement, "pure math" as Bap-
teste puts it. In an infinite multiverse, where all possible scenar-
ios actually realize, albeit with very different probabilities, we
naturally find ourselves in one of those, extremely rare O-
regions where the conditions are conducive to the evolution of
complex life forms. This is all there is to anthropic selection
which it is not any kind of active selection process. This conceptBiology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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is the very opposite of any kind of teleological scenario: there is
nothing special about our region of the universe except that it
belongs to the relatively small biophylic domain of the parame-
ter space of the multiverse (e.g., refs. 14,15), and even within
that domain, a region with such properties is rare (the fact that
this region is very special to us because we live here is scientifi-
cally irrelevant). Effectively, under this concept, the conditions
for the onset of biological evolution emerge by the power of large
numbers, without the involvement of any special interactions let
alone any directional process. I think this is the ultimate anti-
teleogical stance. To conclude the discussion of the anthropic
principle, it might be helpful to emphasize, once again, its cru-
cial link to the multiverse model. In a solitary universe, as
depicted by the classical Big Bang model, anthropic principle
would amount to enormous luck; that, indeed, would be a Pan-
glossian world. In the infinite multiverse, the element of luck is
removed, and the emergence of an infinite number of instanti-
ations of life is guaranteed as long as life is compatible with the
laws of physics (the one example we are familiar with proves
that it is), even if the biophilic regions of a universe are enor-
mously far between. I would like to quote a rather categorical
statement of Leonard Susskind (the inventor of the original ver-
sion of string theory) on the connection between the multiverse
(megaverse, in his parlance) and the anthropic principle:
"Without the idea of a megaverse of pockets, there is no natural
way to formulate a sensible Anthropic Principle" (Ref. 8, p.
300).
The main text of this paper contains a clear statement on Intel-
ligent Deisgn (ID) but, since this is a serious concern for Bap-
teste (and I agree that ID is an important, even if meta-
scientific, issue), I will reiterate and further reinforce my posi-
tion that directly follows from the reasoning explicated in this
paper. The above discussion of the anthropic principle implies
an unequivocal sentence for Intelligent Design; let us spell it
out. As indicated above, in an infinite multiverse, anthropic
selection guarantees the emergence of systems of whatever com-
plexity that are required for the biological evolution to take off
(see Fig. 3). This scenario is watertight: first, chance/anthropic
selection, then biological evolution. There is no gap here where
the ID wedge could fit. Properly interpreted, the anthropic prin-
ciple is a death knell to ID.
Obviously, anthropic principle is often misinterpreted as provid-
ing support to religious (and otherwise teleological) believes
(regrettably, this includes Bapteste's review). On this issue, I
cannot resist quoting the recent book by Richard Dawkins: "It
is a strange fact, incidentally, that religious apologists love the
anthropic principle. For some reason that makes no sense at all,
they think it supports their case. Precisely the opposite is true.
The anthropic principle, like natural selection, is an alternative
to the design hypothesis. It provides a rational, design-free
explanation for the fact that we find ourselves in a situation
propitious to our existence" (Dawkins, R. 2006. The God
Delusion, Houghton Mifflin, Boston-NewYork,
p.136).Just like Dawkins, I find it difficult to identify the exact
reasons behind the confusion (though see further discussion in
my response to Krakauer's review). The possibility that the ID
crowd interprets this paper as support for their cause is one of
Bapteste's main concerns. Will they, actually? No doubt they
will! However, the only way to prevent them from doing so is to
stop publishing research on any hard problem in evolutionary
biology and somehow declare these problems solved. The ID
folks do no research themselves, so they apply all their consider-
able intellectual resources to turn published scientific work
upside down and claim support for ID (it happened to several
seemingly innocuous papers of mine, to my considerable amuse-
ment). I believe evolutionary biologists should not and actually
can not worry about this, only about their own papers being cor-
rect and coherent.
Reviewer 2: David Krakauer (Santa Fe Institute)
As this paper is somewhat unusual, consisting more of a
philosophical contribution at this stage than a scientific
one, my review will be concordantly, somewhat unusual.
I should declare at once that I do not share Professor
Koonin's perspective on the early origin of life and the
role of what is sometimes called " anthropic" reasoning or
the self-selection principle. Anthropic reasoning has
proved to be of some utility in string theory where the
superabundance of meta-stable low energy vacua (or dis-
tinct universes with distinct parameters) realized through
inflationary mechanisms, has proved a challenge to those
projects seeking to derive our universe from first princi-
ples. The weak anthropic principle seeks to determine
what we can expect to observe by the conditions necces-
sary for our presence. The principle first suggested by
Carter is a perfectly scientific statement, and somewhat
surprisingly has value in allowing us to apply Bayesian
inference to cosmological phenomena. Carter was also
the first to apply anthropic principles to the origin of life
in 1983, where it was argued that many steps in the early
evolution of life might have been fairly improbable, an
argument pursued at greater length in this contribution.
My principal objection throughout this review will be that
the anthropic principle is only scientific in so far as it can
do some work, in allowing us to calculate different states
of order. Without the calculation it remains an interesting
metaphysical insight.
Author's response: I do not strongly disagree except that I
believe that the demand for "calculation" is unnecessarily nar-
row. To be scientifically useful, a principle (concept, hypothesis
etc) must offer testable predictions, quantitative or qualitative.
Both kinds of predictions are given in this manuscript, qualita-
tive ones in the body of the paper, and quantitative ones in the
Appendix. Granted, the latter are toy calculations but calcula-
tions nevertheless. Thus, by this simple criterion, this work is
"physics" not metaphysics, even as metaphysical implications
abound.Biology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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The Koonin Hypothesis (KH for short) is clearly stated on
p12 of the manuscript, "The core elements of the transla-
tion system, namely a RNA -only ribosome and the spe-
cific adaptors for, at least, a subset of the 20 modern
protein amino acids emerged by chance and were
anthropically selected." In other words, one of the core
structures upon which all of life depends arose in a series
of highly improbable steps. Following the theory of large
deviations, replication and translation emerged as an
exponentially unlikely event in proportion to its deviation
from a suitable equilibrium ground state. This we might
call an "ahistorical" theory of proto-biology.
Author's response: I have no objection to Krakauer's state-
ment that the quoted phrase formulates KH; let it be so. How-
ever, to completely disambiguate the issue, I should reiterate
that KH is just a strong, extreme version of a more general
framework that, in the same tongue-in-cheek style, I will denote
KC (Koonin Concept). The KC can be stated thus: biological
evolution started when the minimal complexity
required for that was reached through processes gov-
erned by anthropic selection. Further, I think that defining
KC/KH as "ahistorical" is somewhat misleading. There is his-
tory involved, for sure, just not biological evolution/selection.
Speaking of these concepts as "non-selectionist" or "non-adap-
tationist" would be more accurate.
The history of science, is by one reading, interpreted as a
catalogue of conceptual bottlenecks overcome by synthe-
sizing unlikely concepts. The characteristics of a bottle-
neck are: an inability to make progress based on
contemporary theory and data, a general impetus to
search for radically new ideas, and a correlated tendency
to default to extra-scientific modes of explanation based
on putative forces and miracles. The general theory of rel-
ativity, quantum mechanics and natural selection all
solved hard problems by combining hitherto unrelated
concepts – non-Euclidean geometry and gravity, probabil-
ity and mechanics, density regulation with environmental
selection. Interestingly, all three theories have their non-
scientific resonances, "everything is relative", "everything
is subjective", and "everything was created" descending
from the bottleneck period. The origin of life will require
just such juxtapositions and I find that resorting to
extreme fluctuation reasoning, such as in the KH, some-
what unsatisfactory
I think that the KH falls short of being a scientific state-
ment as it invokes events with no well defined probability
measure, and in addition, eschews identifying mecha-
nisms.
First, with regard to probability spaces, recall that any
probability space includes a sample space of events
(which we can think of as the power set), a set of out-
comes or events (non-empty subsets) the sigma algebras,
and a probability measure that assigns a real value in the
interval 0 to 1 to the events. This value is analogous to a
volume in a state space, and tells us how likely it is that an
event takes place. Now not all events in the power set have
a Lebesgue measure, in other words, there are those to
which we can not assign a volume. This is not as strange
as it seems, as the rational numbers have exactly this prop-
erty. In the KH we are provided with no means of calculat-
ing the probability distribution over biophylic universes,
just the statement that any universe is possible. The
anthropic principle does the work of extracting our uni-
verse by a posteriori declaring that we are in one. This is
logically correct but operationally without value. It has
been stated that the whole history (and future) of the
world exists in the decimal expansion of pie (assuming
that it is random). But the probability that we would find
this history is indeterminate. This is what I worry about in
the KH, that there is no way of assigning a measure to the
replication and translation machinery in the multiverse.
In this paper we have neither any mechanism or con-
straints for the translation system, nor prior observations
on which to base our probability measures. We have only
a conjectured sample space, and no systematic mecha-
nism of coarse graining the relevant measures. This leads
to a rather strange outcome where we might as well assert
that all observed biological order emerged in one step,
including the complete evolutionary history of life. This is
equally as possible as the emergence of an RNA polymer,
and eye or an atom. Notice that these are all equally pos-
sible, namely certain in an infinite multi-verse, as there is
no conceivable way of deciding whether they are all
equally probable without first writing down an appropri-
ate equilibrium theory for the universal ground state, by
making use of relevant cosmological data etc. in our local
space.
Author's response: A probability measure for any events is
readily defined in the MWO multiverse – in fact, the definition
of probability is simpler and more natural than it is in a finite
world inasmuch as probability and frequency become one and
the same (see the new Table 1 I made per Bapteste's sugges-
tion).
Now let's consider mechanisms. Mechanisms represent
our most fundamental intuitions about causality; mecha-
nisms posit relationships between two or more observa-
bles based on a theory of interactions. Mechanistic
theories are always provisional, but their utility can be
inferred through their ability to provide useful predictions
out of sample. Mechanisms offer an alternative to obser-
vation, by interpolating and extrapolating from a finite
body of data. Statistical associations are useful but they
are limited to a single history of observation. MechanismsBiology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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rise above history and are capable of describing an ensem-
ble. Darwin's theory derives its power not from its ability
to explain the bill of a finch, the shell of a snail or the
leaves of the mimosa plant, but because it can account in
part for all of these, and indeed any, adaptive system in
nature, on earth or elsewhere.
In this paper we are provided with no constructive algo-
rithm for arriving at a probability measure for translation
or any natural mechanism by which it might come about.
The reason why the KH stops short of invoking spontane-
ous creation for all levels or organization, is that it is con-
fident that we have a suitable theory – Darwin's theory –
once a certain threshold of biology has been reached. But
this hybrid solution is rather strange as it reveals a possi-
ble inconsistency. If we are faced with a mechanism, the
KH suggests that we should select this above a fluctuation-
based hypothesis. This is prescribed even when the KH is
fully able to account for any level of organization compat-
ible with the laws of physics. In the appendix to the paper,
an informal calculation of the chance emergence of RNA
polymers is provided, whose accuracy I can not judge
within a few orders of magnitude. A very low probability
is adduced and then used to support an infinite multiverse
(O-ring) anthropic selection argument. But as I have
stated above, an infinite model allows for infinite com-
plexity at any level, and so the improbability of the poly-
mer is not really crucial. On the basis of the KH are we
really able to declare that any level of organization above
replication and translation represents a sufficiently large
fluctuation to be radically less probable, and therefore in
need of natural selection? This is an interesting metaphys-
ical idea, but not yet a scientific one.
So what's going on here? I think that we can identify two
primary motivations for this paper: (1) a perhaps some-
what restricted application of scientific reasoning, and (2)
an excessive dependence on natural selection.
I believe we have reached a stage of knowledge where we
need to be pluralistic about the "scientific method". Most
of science has the following features: (1)testable or refut-
able, (2) minimal, (3) extendable or generalizable, and
(4) probable. Not all theories in science possess all of
these properties, but all of them come up in debate in one
form or another. The first or refutability is the Popperian
gold standard. It defines the demarcation criterion of sci-
ence from pseudoscience, distinguishing assertions that
can garner consensus from matters of taste and prejudice.
Theories that are not refutable in principle do not belong
in science. The second is minimality and is closely related
to formalization in mathematics. Science seeks the short-
est description length for regularities in data. We can
always overfit data and this leads to poor prediction out
of sample. Science values minimality both because it aids
comprehension and because it aids prediction. Good sci-
entific theories are generalizable – Newtonian mechanics
works equally well for apples and for planetary masses.
Newton described this propertry as self-conformable. Dar-
wins theory has the same property, it works for bacteria
and blue whales. The probable criterion relates to inter-
theoretic reduction or compatibility. Darwin made exten-
sive use of artificial selection to explain natural selection.
Darwin was building a prior in the space of concepts, in
order to make natural selection intelligible. Theories that
have no prior strike us as somewhat unconvincing.
We can now ask how well the KH performs by comparing
it against the template of constituents of the loosely spec-
ified scientific method. The hypothesis fails the refutation
test prima facie. The KH declares that all organizational
levels are possible. Even if we were to discover a selective
theory or a physical self organizing theory for replication
and translation, the KH could still be true. Nothing can
render it false. Presumably Koonin would no longer sup-
port the anthropic theory, not because it is any less possi-
ble, but because it lacks many of the ingredients that we
have come to value in our scientific ideas. With regard to
minimality, the theory is certainly minimal as it requires
only the laws of physics, but here minimality does not
serve the goal of prediction. Moreover, the theory is not at
all extendable as every realization arises through a unique
series of events. And we are not provided with a calcula-
tion for the probability of translation spontaneously
emerging and fixing. Hence the theory does not fit well
into what we normally think of as science.
It would seem that the primary motivation for the KH is
the absence of a compelling Darwinian account for trans-
lation. But the Darwinian theory is only one of many
alternative theories that seek to explain ordered states in
nature. Before natural selection there existed physics,
chemistry and geology. There is a growing interest in the
possible role that abiotic dynamics have played in the ori-
gin of primary metabolism and primordial replicating sys-
tems. Indeed some of my colleagues have recently
proposed that: "the reverse citric acid cycle is statistically
favored among competing redox relaxation pathways
under early-earth conditions and that this feature drove its
emergence and also accounts for its evolutionary robust-
ness and universality. The ability to enhance the rate of
core reactions creates an energetic basis for selection of
subsequent layers of biological complexity." (Smith and
Morowitz 2004). This is an alternative to a selective
account as under pre-enzymatic conditions, all reactions
that relax the free energy of more stable, small inorganic
molecules are impeded. Thus the essential constituents of
primary metabolism emerge as a reduction sequence in a
physical process of free energy minimization. This is a the-
ory that requires a great deal of further research, both the-Biology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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oretical and empirical, but it conforms to the more
traditional standards that we have come to require of a sci-
entific approach.
Science seeks to understand the probable, and moreover
assign some measure to this concept. There are many
ideas that are possible-yet-untestable, but I see no reason
to opt for these approaches when much traditional sci-
ence remains to be done on the early origin of life, some
of which suggests that life is far more probable than we
have supposed. In an infinite multiverse all life is inevita-
ble, and so we would have little reason to favor one parsi-
monious theory over another.
Author's response: I agree with Krakauer that (as long as one
is interested in a definition of science) a pluralistic definition
would be required. However, I do not think this is the place to
discuss such a definition in general terms. Suffice it to say that
Popperian falsifiability of KH is strongly emphasized in this
paper. The falsifiability of the general framework of KC is a
more touchy matter as almost always is the case with general
concepts, However, a full success of the search for an overarch-
ing selective principle that would precede and override replica-
tion of genetic material, might falsify KC in full. The work of
Smith and Morowitz (, which is mentioned by Krakauer,
(Smith, E., Morowitz, H.J. Universality in intermediary
metabolism. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2004;101:13168–
73) belongs in this area as well as even more detailed proposals
of Pross (e.g., Pross, A. The driving force for life's emer-
gence: kinetic and thermodynamic considerations. J
Theor Biol. 2003; 220:393–406). Certainly, this is a legiti-
mate and, potentially, interesting research direction. However,
I agree with Krakauer that a lot of work is required to take these
studies to a stage where it can be positively claimed that selec-
tion, in a meaningful sense, occurred before the advent of rep-
lication of digital carriers of genetic information. When and if
that happens, KC could become obsolete in its entirety. Until
then, however, I believe that a lot of caution is due. Indeed,
without implying any accusation, I would note that there seems
to be a rather slippery slope here: a non-critical insistence on
selection prior to replication might come suspiciously close to
some sort of "animism" (sensu Monod).
The history of science, is by one reading, interpreted as a
catalogue of conceptual bottlenecks overcome by synthe-
sizing unlikely concepts. The characteristics of a bottle-
neck are: an inability to make progress based on
contemporary theory and data, a general impetus to
search for radically new ideas, and a correlated tendency
to default to extra-scientific modes of explanation based
on putative forces and miracles. The general theory of rel-
ativity, quantum mechanics and natural selection all
solved hard problems by combining hitherto unrelated
concepts – non-Euclidean geometry and gravity, probabil-
ity and mechanics, density regulation with environmental
selection. Interestingly, all three theories have their non-
scientific resonances, "everything is relative", "everything
is subjective", and "everything was created" descending
from the bottleneck period. The origin of life will require
just such juxtapositions and has been generating just such
non-scientific propositions.
Author's response: I further enthusiastically agree with
Krakauer that a productive study of the origins of life requires
juxtaposition of "hitherto unrelated concepts". Indeed, this
paper is an attempt, however imperfect one, to do just that. I do
not believe, however, that the comparison of this work to the
proverbially ridiculous "everything is relative" serves any pur-
pose.
Reviewer 3: Sergei Maslov (Brookhaven 
National Laboratory)
Any manuscript invoking the anthropic selection princi-
ple to explain anything is bound to raise controversy. Let
alone if what is being explained is the origin of Life itself.
I personally liked the style and the clear language of the
manuscript. I also appreciated an honest back of the enve-
lope estimate of the probability of primitive replica-
tion+translation machinery arising by pure chance:
<10^(-1000) (sic!). At the very least this estimate provides
a glimpse at the vast gap between the chance appearance
of a single functional ribozyme replicase (plausible if its
length is <100 nucleotides) and that of more complex
entities such as a rudimentary machinery necessary for
translation.
Author also clearly indicates how his theory could be fal-
sified or modified by future discoveries. For example, the
discovery of independently evolved life in our cosmic
neighborhood would obviously put an end to any
anthropic selection-based models of the origin of Life. On
the other hand, a discovery of an evolutionary plausible
path to the appearance of translational machinery in a
full-fledged RNA world might simply reduce the severity
of the anthropic selection needed to explain the origin of
Life without completely eliminating the need for it.
The manuscript also postpones the discussion of plausi-
bility of a "reactor" which uses raw materials to generate
polynucleotides in sufficient quantity/density. It is simply
stated that while "such "reactors" are not known", "net-
works of inorganic compartments existing at hydrother-
mal vents might be plausible candidates". It might turn
out that the problem of lack or rarity of such reactors
might dwarf the problem of low likelihood of the appear-
ance of replication+translation machinery in one such
reactor.Biology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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Author response: It is curiously serendipitous that, while this
manuscript was under review, new data have been published
indicating that, given that monomers (nucleotides) are synthe-
sized at any appreciable rate, the emergence of a "reactor" pro-
ducing polymers (RNA molecules) in the vicinity of a
hydrothermal vent, is not unlikely. These new findings are
quoted in the revised paper (Refs. 56, 57).
While personally I hope we would find a way to explain
the origin of biocomplexity without invoking the
anthropic selection (perhaps, by some yet unknown
mechanism of self-organization), one cannot deny that at
the present state of affairs in understanding the origin of
Life the anthropic selection at the very least provides a via-
ble alternative.
Author response: Actually, I think a rather common misun-
derstanding is involved here. I am convinced that the anthropic
principle is unavoidable as part and parcel of any scenario for
the origin of life, whether or not some still unknown principles
of self-organization exist (they very well might). Plenty of
anthropic selection is required to account for the formation gal-
axies and earth-like planets, prebiological organic syntheses etc
etc. The real question is not whether or not anthropic selection
is important (to me, there is no doubt whatever) but where is
the transition between it and biological evolution, the threshold
of complexity where Darwinian selection becomes possible (see
Fig. 1 in this paper). In this regard, one certainly may "hope"
that the threshold is (considerably?) below the level of complex-
ity associated with a coupled system of translation and replica-
tion (again, see Fig. 1) but so far there is no strong evidence or
even a compelling model of biological evolution occurring at
this stage.
Reviewer 4: Itai Yanai (Harvard University)
In this work, Eugene Koonin estimates the probability of
arriving at a system capable of undergoing Darwinian evo-
lution and comes to a cosmologically small number. With
such an improbable event at hand, Koonin turns to a cos-
mological perspective in order to grasp its feasibility. He
cites recent work in cosmology that highlights the vastness
of the universe, where any series of events is necessarily
played out an infinite number of times. This so-called
"many-worlds in one" model essentially reconceives any
chance event as a necessary one, where its (absolute)
abundance is proportional to its chance of occurring.
The context of this article is framed by the current lack of
a complete and plausible scenario for the origin of life.
Koonin specifically addresses the front-runner model,
that of the RNA-world, where self-replicating RNA mole-
cules precede a translation system. He notes that in addi-
tion to the difficulties involved in achieving such a system
is the paradox of attaining a translation system through
Darwinian selection. That this is indeed a bona-fide para-
dox is appreciated by the fact that, without a shortage
effort, a plausible scenario for translation evolution has
not been proposed to date. There have been other models
for the origin of life, including the ground-breaking Lipid-
world model advanced by Segrè, Lancet and colleagues
(reviewed in EMBO Reports (2000), 1(3), 217–222), but
despite much ingenuity and effort, it is fair to say that all
origin of life models suffer from astoundingly low proba-
bilities of actually occurring.
Koonin's main contributions in this manuscript are two-
fold: 1. a description of a minimal "breakthrough system"
capable of priming Darwinian evolution" and most
importantly 2. relating the issue of overcoming probabil-
ity barriers by defaulting to the anthropic principle, which
is supported by advances in cosmology. Together these
provide for a model of the origin of life where the "break-
through system" appears by chance and is sufficient to
prime Darwinian evolution. Koonin distinguishes
between a strong and weak form of this model. In the
strong form, the entire "breakthrough system" occurs
entirely by chance. While in the weak form, a less complex
system (and thus more cosmologically common) is found
that is able to achieve Darwinian evolution. Should such
a less complex system be discovered, the breakthrough
system as Koonin describes it will have been falsified;
however, even this less complex system is likely to be van-
ishingly rare and consequently also requires the anthropic
principle to account for its occurrence on Earth. Of course,
the model would also be falsified if the "many-worlds in
one" model is itself falsified.
Overall, this is a bold manuscript that promises to deeply
influence the stream of thought on the origin of life. To
my knowledge the present model represents the first one
to account for the origin of life by explicitly invoking the
anthropic principle. Whereas the sufficiency of time has
been questioned for evolving life, invoking the anthropic
principle allows for an elegant – albeit science-fiction-like
– way out of this chicken and egg problem.
From this perspective, future advances in the field of the
origin of life may better estimate the ubiquity of life in the
universe by attempting to break down the "breakthrough
system" into less complex parts. In the very extreme,
future work may show that starting from just a simple
assembly of molecules, non-anthropic principles can
account for each step along the rise to the threshold of
Darwinian evolution. Based upon the new perspective
afforded to us by Koonin this now appears unlikely.
Author's response: I agree with most of the statements in this
constructive comment. Once again, however, I should note
that, the way I see this situation, it is impossible to shun
anthropic reasoning completely, whatever the advances ofBiology Direct 2007, 2:15 http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/15
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future work. As Yanai puts it, "in the very extreme", one could
dream of non-anthropically explaining the entire sequence of
evolutionary steps from monomers to a RNA-protein world.
However, in the preceding history, an anthropic component
inevitably will remain.
Perhaps, to complete the discussion, a final comment on the
anthropic principle/selection/reasoning is due here. In all four
reviews of this work, regardless of the other opinions of the
reviewers, there is a strong emphasis on the anthropic principle
that, in my view, is somewhat misplaced. Surely, the anthropic
principle is important. However, I believe that it is secondary to
the actual model of the uni(multi)verse. Indeed, the infinite
repetition of all permissible histories in the MWO cosmology
makes anthropic selection a straightforward epiphenomenon of
the model (see text and Table 1). I should add that I also find
it to be more satisfying philosophically that the model is put
ahead of a "principle". Should the model be falsified, the status
of the principle will become uncertain, and of course, the entire
concept developed here, if not refuted in its entirety, will require
a drastic revision (as rightly emphasized by Yanai).
Authors' contributions
EVK conceived of the model, performed the calculations
involved, and wrote the manuscript.
Appendix
Probabilities of the emergence, by chance, of different 
versions of the breakthrough system in an O-region: a toy 
calculation of the upper bounds
General assumptions: an O-region contains 1022 stars and
every 10th star has a habitable planet, hence 1021 habitable
planets (undoubtedly, a gross over-estimation because, in
reality, most stars have no planets at all, let alone habita-
ble ones). Each planet is the size of earth and has a 10 kil-
ometer (106 cm) thick habitable layer; hence the volume
of the habitable layer is 4/3π[R3-(R-l)3] ≈ 5 × 1024 cm3,
where R is the radius of the planet and l is the thickness of
the habitable layer. RNA synthesis occurs in 1% of the vol-
ume of the habitable layer, i.e., a volume V ≈ 5 × 1022 cm3
is available for RNA synthesis (undoubtedly, a gross over-
estimation because, in reality, there would be very few
"RNA-making reactors"). Let the concentration of nucle-
otides in volume V and the rate of the synthesis of RNA
molecules of size n (a free parameter depending on the
specific model of the breakthrough stage; hereinafter n-
mer) be 1 molecule/cm3/second (a gross overestimate for
any sizable molecule; furthermore, the inverse depend-
ence on n, which is expected to be strong, is disregarded).
The time available after the Big Bang of the given O-region
(as an upper bound) of all planets in it is 1010 years ≈ 3 ×
1017 seconds. Then, the number of uniquen-mers "tried
out" during the time after the Big Bang is:
S ≈ 5 × 1022 × 1021 × 3 × 1017 ≈ 1.5 × 1061.
Let us assume that, for the onset of biological evolution, a
unique n-mer is required. The number of such sequences
is N = 4n ≈100.6n.
Then, the expectation of the number of times a unique n-
mer emerges in an O-region is: E = S/N = 1.5 × 1061/100.6n
and n = log(E × 1.5 × 1061)/0.6.
Substituting E = 1, we get n ≈102 (nucleotides). Note that,
because n is proportional to logS, the estimate is highly
robust to the assumptions on the values of the contribut-
ing variables; e.g., a order of magnitude change in S will
result in an increase or decrease of n by less than 2 nucle-
otides.
A ribozyme replicase consisting of ~100 nucleotides is
conceivable, so, in principle, spontaneous origin of such
an entity in a finite universe consisting of a single O-
region cannot be ruled out in this toy model (again, the
rate of RNA synthesis considered here is a deliberate, gross
over-estimate).
The requirements for the emergence of a primitive, cou-
pled replication-translation system, which is considered a
candidate for the breakthrough stage in this paper, are
much greater. At a minimum, spontaneous formation of:
- two rRNAs with a total size of at least 1000 nucleotides
- ~10 primitive adaptors of ~30 nucleotides each, in total,
~300 nucleotides
- at least one RNA encoding a replicase, ~500 nucleotides
(low bound)is required. In the above notation, n = 1800,
resulting in E <10-1018.
In other words, even in this toy model that assumes a
deliberately inflated rate of RNA production, the proba-
bility that a coupled translation-replication emerges by
chance in a single O-region is P < 10-1018. Obviously, this
version of the breakthrough stage can be considered only
in the context of a universe with an infinite (or, in the very
least, extremely vast) number of O-regions.
The model considered here is not supposed to be realistic
by any account. It only serves to illustrate the difference in
the demands on chance for the origin of different versions
of the breakthrough system (see Fig. 1) and hence the con-
nections between these versions and different cosmologi-
cal models of the universe.
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